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Abstract: Because the whole book’s issue assumes the uneven integrations of 
national/continental urban systems inside the global economy, this chapter evaluates the 
rates and qualitative modes of integration of the national urban systems by the economic 
networks that are dominated by multinational firms. The empirical study encompasses the 
largest 1,250 cities of the World delineated in a comparative way according to common 
definitions of Large Urban Regions (LUR). The position of LURs in multinational firms’ 
ownership networks in two years, 2010 and 2013, correspond to the deepest period of the 
crisis and the following recovery, respectively. Thus, we checked that the fast re-
organization of multinational firms facing this crisis between 2010 and 2013 did not 
fundamentally transform their strong urban organization but rather introduced some minor 
changes, particularly due to the simultaneous breakthrough of emergent countries’ 
companies (especially the Chinese ones). Synthetic network clustering methods 
partitioning cities of the world, offer clear visions of the structure of the multipolar urban 
networks. They reveal “regions” of integration of cities for all kinds of multinational 
companies but also distinguishing companies’ according to their skill levels either in 
Industry or in Services. A special attention is given to some highly integrated cities 
appearing with properties of “City-States” i.e. without a strong national urban system. 
 
Keywords: Networks of cities; Globalization; Multinational firms; Clustering methods; 
multipolar system. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Before analyzing the evolution of national or continental urban systems in detail, we 
propose an insight into the complexity of inter-urban interactions: how cities unevenly 
support national and transnational processes of globalization and are, in turn, transformed 
by these networks. This specific urban view brings original information beyond the basic 
international game between countries (Storper, 1997; Scott, 2012). The acceleration of 
globalization trends since the end of the Second World War has, with different speeds, 
rates and qualitative modes, affected national urban systems that were previously 
strengthened through the constitution of nation states during the 19th and 20th centuries.  
 
Cities’ linkages within the global networks of multinational firms are significant aspects of 
these global processes because they transgress the boundaries of longstanding solidarities 
formerly installed inside the boundaries of nation-states. We use an original database at a 
global scale to measure the extent to which the financial linkages deployed within and 
between cities among the subsidiaries owned by multinational firms, have created new 
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patterns in the organization of systems of cities1. Are transnational linkages establishing 
new sources of interdependencies that would substitute for the longstanding co-evolution 
in national urban systems? Does this globalization process affect cities equally? Do 
multinational firms adapt to the existing structure of national urban systems, or are they 
more selective? If the latter is the case, do they structure new cities’ networks and at what 
scale, intra-nationally or across countries? 
 
Multinational firm networks are recognized as the main drivers of economic globalization. 
They have exploded over the last four decades, but they have also been affected by the 
deep financial crisis of 2008. To discuss their long-term interaction with cities and their 
shorter-term interactions, i.e., the effects of the global crisis on levels of urban system 
integration, this chapter examines the position of cities in these networks in two years, 
2010 and 2013, which correspond to the deepest period of the crisis and the following 
recovery, respectively. The long- and short-term dynamics of cities’ globalization requires 
distinguishing the structural aspects from the conjectural variations. Thus, we checked that 
the fast re-organization of multinational firms facing this crisis between 2010 and 2013 did 
not fundamentally transform their strong urban organization but rather introduced some 
minor changes, particularly due to the simultaneous breakthrough of emergent countries’ 
companies (especially the Chinese ones).  
 
The interactions between multinational firms, cities and states respective developments are 
a critical polemic issue. Globalization has been seen by a majority of influential scientists 
for more than twenty-five years as a game that involves a limited number of “global cities” 
while ignoring national borders (Sassen, 1991; Taylor, 2001; Taylor et al., 2003, 2015). 
However, other approaches of “nested cities” (Hill, Fujita, 2003; Rozenblat, 2004) contest 
this restricted vision and argue that national structures still impose heavy constraints on 
cities’ characteristics and dynamics. However, the latter view does not deny the 
globalization processes, and the former has numerous nuanced arguments.  
 
For instance, Sassen (2007, 2010) emphasizes that globalization is so much embedded 
inside the national institutions that it reshapes them: “Multiple national conditions and 
dynamics are likely to be engaged by the global and often are the global, but function 
inside the national” (Sassen, 2010, p.2). In fact, the limits between national and 
international become increasingly fuzzy such that national and local governments’ and 
private actors’ actions address international issues. Although some cities seem to abstract 
from their national urban systems, the urban policies are still limited by the national 
institutional environment, which determines a large part of the general growth and, thus, 
the possible gains through agglomeration economies (Polese, 2005). Local public actions 
are intrinsically linked to national environments, which are composed by culture, values 
and trust (Fukayama, 1995; Landis & Zhang, 1998) that determine the scope of the role of 
institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly & Levine, 2001). These institutions are 
themselves not fixed: they evolve according to internal dynamics that are influenced by 
media, business, finance and intellectuals extending cultural and political globalization 
(Short & Kim, 1999).  
 
                                               
1 The empirical study of cities’ globalization is based on a large database that we update regularly, 
encompassing the direct or indirect ownership networks of the 3,000 main groups of the world 
(approximately 800,000 enterprises linked by 1 million financial linkages at each date and positioned in 
comparative urban areas [see (2) below for more precision]) (source: Bureau Van Dijk, 2010, 2013). 
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These transformations of national urban structures under the influence of feedback loops 
within globalization processes are among the core issues of this book. We assume that the 
degree of globalization’s influence on the transformation of the national urban structure 
varies widely throughout the world. The intermediary levels that are created between the 
national and the global, i.e., free trade zones and international agreements, integrate cities 
within dynamics that overpass national borders but do so in combination with national or 
regional path-dependent specificities that impose a reciprocal adaptation.  
 
 
2. Measuring the position of cities within global networks 
 
Studying inter-city networks helps reveal the mutual interdependencies between cities’ 
trajectories but requires caution in the data construction, analysis and visualization 
methods. 
 
2.1 Evaluating the inter-cities networks through multinational firms’ ownership 
linkages 
 
Empirical measurements of urban connectivity are generally developed on the basis of 
samples of multinational firm networks that are summed to assess the weight of cities (the 
nodes of this graph) and links between cities (edges of the graph) (Pred, 1977; Cohen, 
1981; Rozenblat & Pumain, 1993, 2007). Multinational firms deploy networks of two 
different natures: on the one hand, networks that are internal to the company are created 
through the multiplication of subsidiaries or joint ventures in different countries within the 
same group; on the other hand, external networks of subcontracting, alliances and 
coordination are developed with other companies. Internal business networks are more 
stable and dense in terms of interactions than external networks: it is through internal 
networks that most of the capital, know-how and technological or managerial innovations 
are spread (Walter et al., 2007).  
 
Thus, to base the evaluation of cities’ interactions on strong and stable networks, we use 
firms’ ownership networks (internal networks) that represent the "observed" financial links 
between companies and creating "quasi-trees" made up of chains of filiations, as adopted 
by other authors (Alderson & Beckfield, 2004; Wall, 2009). We built a large database of 
all direct and indirect links of financial ownership developed directly or indirectly by the 
top 3,000 worldwide companies according to their turnover in 2009 (for 2010) and in 2012 
(for 2013) based on the best possible source of information (ORBIS, Bureau van Dijk, 
2010, 2013)2. The University of Lausanne and the European Research Council (ERC) 
Grant GeodiverCity completed it especially for the locations and activities of firms. The 
two teams developed deep work on the geographical aggregation of firms by “Large Urban 
Regions” (LURs) at the world scale, corresponding to extended functional urban regions 
(Rozenblat et al., 2017), which allows us to compare cities with similar delineations 
throughout the world. We refer to them as LURs or cities, interchangeably3.  
                                               
2 This database encompasses about 700,00 subsidiaries in 2010 and 800,000 subsidiaries in 2013, linked by 1 
million filiation links in 2010 and 1.2 million in 2013. The 3,000 first firms are different in 2010 and in 2013, 
only maintaining a common part, for which the network of subsidiaries could change. Through these 
independent data, we can evaluate the main strength of the global networks at each date, considering the 
transformations of the dominant economic actors. 
3 This preparation needs some huge efforts and a high-level expertise for each country to evaluate the 
relevance of the LURs’ delineations. 
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In order to shift from these individual firms’ networks towards cities’ networks, and as the 
exact proportion of owned capital is not always given with enough precision, we measured 
the intensity of a city relationship with any other city by adding the total number of 
financial relations of the firms located in the couple of LURs: LOij is the number of 
subsidiaries located in the city j having their headquarters (or a minority shareholder) in the 
city i. All the oriented linkages 𝑙"#$ 	of the enterprises e having a shareholder or an 
headquarters in city i and a subsidiary located in city j, count for 1 and are summed up to 
obtain LOij: 
 𝐿𝑂"# = ∑ 𝑙"#$*$+,  (1) 
 
Note that the city j can also have enterprises f hosting shareholders who invest in 
subsidiaries of the city i. Then the non-oriented link LNOij between cities i and j is 
expressed as follows: 
 𝐿𝑁𝑂"# = ∑ 𝑙"#$*$+, +∑ 𝑙#"./.+,  (2) 
 
In the empirical following study, we will specify when we will use oriented or non-
oriented linkages. 
 
The total weight of each city in the network can be revealed by two different values:  
- Hi; the number of controls from headquarters of i to other cities j is evaluated by the 
number of outgoing ownership linkages from the city i towards all other cities j; 
- Sj: the number of links of subsidiarity of j from all other cities i is measured by the 
number of ingoing linkages of the city j from all the other cities i (as these linkages 
are oriented from the headquarters’ LUR i to the subsidiaries of the LUR j, Hi is 
different from Si). 
 
Hi and Sj are computed as expressed in equations (3) and (4): 
 𝐻" = ∑ 𝐿𝑂"#1#+,   (3) 
 𝑆# = ∑ 𝐿𝑂"#3"+,  (4) 
 
In the network analysis, the value of Hi is also called the city’s “Weighted Out-Degree” 
(here representing the power of subsidiaries’ control that is concentrated in the city i on 
subsidiaries outside the city i) and the value Sj is the city’s “Weighted In-Degree” (the 
attractiveness of the city j for subsidiaries controlled from outside the city j). 
 
Our method for measuring interurban linkages through multinational firm ownership is 
rather different from the approach widely spread out by the GaWC group (Globalization 
and World Cities group, Loughborough University). The GaWC developed a popular 
approach for advanced business service firms (Taylor, 2001). However, their method 
consists of building hypothetical networks from the information about the location of 
firms: they connect all firms belonging to the same group by all possible links, which 
creates "complete graphs" (graphs connecting all the units of each group). This 
construction tends to amplify the centrality attributed to the largest cities (Neal, 2012). 
Because of this bias and because of their significance, we prefer to consider “real” linkages 
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that are observed and measured by the financial ownership linkages between firms. 
 
 
2.2 The core of the worldwide complex network of cities 
 
The worldwide urban system of multinational firms’ ownership networks appears as a very 
complex system in 2010 and in 2013. We registered 1,206 LURs deploying a total of 
37,116 oriented and weighted linkages with other LURSs in 2010 (for about 900.000 
firms’ linkages) and 1,253 LURs with 40,685 oriented and weighted linkages in 2013 (for 
about 1 million firms’ linkages). To identify the core of this worldwide urban system and 
avoid considering anecdotic linkages, we selected the main LURs in this network to make 
the Figure 1 (i.e., cities having more than 50 control and subsidiary linkages). We also 
selected the largest number of oriented linkages with a minimum threshold of 10 firms’ 
links between cities from the headquarters to the subsidiaries. The resulting simplified 
network includes 631 cities in 2010 (5,776 linkages) and 718 cities in 2013 (6,398 
linkages) (Fig.1). On this graph, we positioned cities according to the intensity of their 
reciprocal linkages but not according to their location: the closer they are, the more 
linkages with their neighbors they will have in the network.  
 
Regardless of the chosen years, i.e., 2010 or 2013, the main pattern of the network is 
composed of one single component, which means that cities form a unique network in 
which all cities are connected. Another interesting feature is that inside this global 
network, more compact clusters of highly connected cities emerge, which correspond to 
cities that are on the same continents (illustrated by the color of the cities and their linkages 
on figure 1). We may thus conclude that “space matters” in the economy (indeed, physical 
and cultural proximity) and that the “first law of geography” (Tobler, 1972) still operates 
as a constraint on the strategies of global firms when they choose their urban locations 
(Rozenblat, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Major Urban Network of multinational firms’ ownership linkages (2010-2013) 
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European and North American cities are at the core of the network. The two clusters 
remain rather isolated from each other, thus confirming high continental cohesion. On 
these two continents, London, Paris and New York are the main centers of the network. 
They polarize the larger part of the worldwide cities’ network, and London is at the 
interface between the two continents.  
 
Cities from other continents are connected to these two central clusters. Asian and Oceania 
cities (in orange) are divided into two main parts: on the one side, Japanese cities, which 
started their integration with globalization in the 1970s, including Tokyo, are strongly 
connected with London and New York. On the other side, Chinese and Indian cities 
entered the globalization process later (starting in the 1990s). Here, Hong-Kong, Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen drive the integration of other Chinese cities (as soon as in 2010), 
as Mumbai and Delhi do for Indian cities. Moscow polarizes another cluster forming an 
isolated system of the ex-Soviet Republics. Other South American, Middle East and 
African cities are spread throughout the network among European or North American 
cities. 
 
The network did not change much between 2010 and 2013, which confirms a very stable 
structure of the cities’ network, although the two samples of firms are not completely 
similar. The main change between 2010 and 2013 is the increasing size of the network 
accompanied by the slight growth of its complexity. Indeed, the density of the total 
network of cities evolved from an average of 30 links per city in 2010 to 32 in 20134. It 
means that a process of diffusion of the integration of globalization among new cities with 
a densification of linkages between cities that were already in the network.  
 
Among the new cities appearing in 2013, the most are from South America. They are 
preferentially linked to Spanish and Portuguese cities, due to their linguistic proximity. In 
addition, Asian cities, particularly Chinese cities, have become more numerous.  
 
In summary, the two consecutive patterns of 2010 and 2013 outline two main features that 
are further developed below: 
- There is a stable high cohesion between cities by continental and national zones at both 
dates. 
- Between the dates, the networks seem to become less centralized in the main core cities 
of the network. 
 
 
2.3 National and continental scales of cities’ insertion into worldwide networks 
 
In absolute terms, the global number of all registered linkages of multinational firms 
increased between 2010 and 2013, but the linkages grew at unequal speeds according to 
the various geographical scopes (Tab.1).  
  
                                               
4 These calculations are based on the total initial number of cities and all their weighted linkages.  
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Table 1: Scope of multinational firms’ linkages by continents and selected countries (2010-2013) 
2010 Scope of multinational firms' linkages  
  
intra-
urban 
Intra-
national 
Intra-
continental 
Inter-
continental 
TOTAL intra-
urban 
Intra-
national 
Intra-
continental 
Inter-
continental 
  number number number number number % row % row % row % row 
TOTAL 277 492 663 457 809 081 394 628 1 006 412 27.6 65.9 80.4 19.6 
Continents             
Africa 652 2 704 3 039 9 369 12 408 5.3 21.8 24.5 75.5 
Asia and Oceania 31 132 87 940 99 714 73 304 173 018 18.0 50.8 57.6 42.4 
Europe 221 627 402 766 519 818 141 584 661 402 33.5 60.9 78.6 21.4 
South America 2 721 5 729 8 438 48 026 56 464 4.8 10.1 14.9 85.1 
North America 20 224 162 795 176 079 119 048 295 127 6.9 55.2 59.7 40.3 
Middle East 1 136 1 523 1 993 2 551 4 544 25.0 33.5 43.9 56.1 
Countries             
China 3 731 8 951 11 757 18 064 29 821 12.5 30.0 39.4 60.6 
Brazil 461 1 390 1 751 5 376 7 127 6.5 19.5 24.6 75.4 
Russia 20 002 48 357 52 450 989 53 439 37.4 90.5 98.1 1.9 
India 2 095 4 656 5 424 5 848 11 272 18.6 41.3 48.1 51.9 
South Africa 191 1 724 1 955 3 106 5 061 3.8 34.1 38.6 61.4 
USA 17 087 147 246 160 517 109 155 269 672 6.3 54.6 59.5 40.5 
Japan 14 805 34 736 38 260 18 416 56 676 26.1 61.3 67.5 32.5 
Great Britain 88 926 122 926 157 128 43 607 200 735 44.3 61.2 78.3 21.7 
Germany 25 123 46 257 73 393 14 769 88 162 28.5 52.5 83.2 16.8 
France 25 027 58 625 89 262 23 220 112 482 22.2 52.1 79.4 20.6 
 
2013 Scope of multinational firms' linkages 
  
intra-
urban 
Intra-
national 
Intra-
continental 
Inter-
continental 
TOTAL intra-
urban 
Intra-
national 
Intra-
continental 
Inter-
continental 
  number number number number number % % % % 
TOTAL 304 759 754 398 931 655 264 342 1 195 997 25.5 63.1 77.9 22.1 
Continents              
Africa 2 236 6 498 7 453 16 284 23 737 9.4 27.4 31.4 68.6 
Asia and Oceania 34 658 123 651 144 658 111 854 256 512 13.5 48.2 56.4 43.6 
Europe 232 881 417 249 552 247 177 610 729 857 31.9 57.2 75.7 24.3 
South America 5 442 9 598 14 894 65 673 80 567 6.8 11.9 18.5 81.5 
North America 28 594 195 382 209 929 155 033 364 962 7.8 53.5 57.5 42.5 
Middle East 954 2 008 2 462 4 562 7 024 13.6 28.6 35.1 64.9 
Countries              
China 5 691 26 187 30 346 25 313 55 659 10.2 47.0 54.5 45.5 
Brazil 1 051 3 072 3 688 8 303 11 991 8.8 25.6 30.8 69.2 
Russia 11 828 30 944 36 501 1 701 38 202 31.0 81.0 95.5 4.5 
India 2 424 7 496 8 902 9 258 18 160 13.3 41.3 49.0 51.0 
South Africa 1 410 4 815 5 527 5 082 10 609 13.3 45.4 52.1 47.9 
USA 25 355 185 099 199 646 144 134 343 780 7.4 53.8 58.1 41.9 
Japan 13 072 37 258 43 371 24 255 67 626 19.3 55.1 64.1 35.9 
Great Britain 71 471 97 867 134 817 52 307 187 124 38.2 52.3 72.0 28.0 
Germany 31 774 56 833 89 567 18 827 108 394 29.3 52.4 82.6 17.4 
France 31 348 61 659 93 303 25 223 118 526 26.4 52.0 78.7 21.3 
Source: ORBIS - BvD, 2010, 2013, UNIL-IGD, GeodiverCity 
 
The intercontinental linkages had slow growth (20% in 2010, 22% in 2013), which 
undoubtedly reflects a long-term progressive increase of the proportion of intercontinental 
linkages, which have roughly kept the same speed as the previous period (18% in 2006) 
(Rozenblat, 2010). Conversely, intra-continental and national linkages decreased in 
proportion. The intra-urban linkages (when owners and subsidiaries are located in the same 
Large Urban Region), despite absolute growth, decreased in proportion (from 27.6% to 
25.5%).  
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However, these trends were very unequal according to countries and continents 5. The 
place in the world that lost the most linkages during the period is Great Britain, mostly in 
its intra-urban and intra-national linkages. However, Great Britain cities continued to 
increase their inter-continental linkages from 2010 to 2013. This principally confirms the 
position of London maintaining its centrality in worldwide financial networks. The other 
developed countries increased the number of their multinational firms’ linkages at all 
scales, except Japan, where the local (intra-urban) level is decreasing. These countries also 
have approximately 50% of all their multinational firms’ linkages within their national 
territory, which reveal a strong national base composed of a complex network of several 
national cities. Cities of these countries also exhibit strong complex internal networks 
among their own companies, whose reflect a high level of capitalism, where uncertainty is 
addressed locally by strong interactions and recombination between economic resources 
(Stark, 1996). This phenomenon is much less visible in the urban areas of the United 
States, where companies may have developed these interactions more intensively at an 
early stage at the national level. 
 
During the 2010-2013 period, most of the emerging countries had rapid growth in the 
number of multinational firms’ linkages, except Russia. China and South Africa increased 
more rapidly, particularly their national inter-urban linkages. Thus, their insertion in 
multinational firm networks, which was mainly inter-continental in 2010 and was induced 
by the external investments coming mostly from developed countries, was balanced in 
2013 by more intra-national linkages possibly resulting from two simultaneous processes: 
- An increase of national multinational enterprises supported by numerous national 
cities and 
- A diffusion of foreign multinational enterprises in the national urban system. 
Brazil also widely increased its number of multinational firms’ linkages, but its share of 
intercontinental linkages remained high in 2013, thus revealing a delay in the process of 
reinforcement of its national urban system (19% in 2010 to 25% in 2013). 
 
The differences in the expansion of multinational firms by countries and continents are not 
strictly due to urban processes. In fact, they depend partly on the bilateral and multilateral 
agreements made by nation-states and international economic institutions. However the 
national/continental cohesions are widely supported by the economies and social fabrics of 
cities. In fact, more than 90% of all multinational firms’ headquarters and subsidiaries are 
located in large urban areas, where they participate in the local milieu and in external inter-
urban exchanges. In this way, countries’ development is mostly based on the capacity of 
their cities to contribute to the development of such networks. 
 
 
2.4 Cities’ hierarchies according to multinational firms’ networks 
 
Multinational firms are distributed among the cities of the world without introducing a 
strong hierarchy (Fig.2). In fact, the Rank-Size graphs of cities according to the number of 
ownership (Hi) or subsidiary linkages (Sj) result in a rather concave curve (in both 2010 
and 2013 without any major change except a relative decrease in the first city for the 
number of ownerships [on the left graph: London] and a relative increase in the first city 
for the number of subsidiaries [on the right graph: again London]). In the language of 
                                               
5 We note that this total is not the sum of continents or countries because for the example of continents, inter-continental 
linkages count for each of them (counting twice, i.e., for both continents they concern). This explains why the proportion 
of inter-continental linkages is much higher for each continent than it is for the total. 
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complex systems, one can say that this network of cities formed by the financial linkages 
between multinational firms is not strictly “scale free”, which means that it is not 
organized according to a unique hierarchy of cities that would emerge from the 
globalization process. Conversely, the global pattern seems to consist of different sub-
groups whose connections form the whole system. 
 
Figure 2: Hierarchies of cities worldwide according to the Network of multinational firms’ 
ownership linkages (2010-2013) 
 
Some of these subgroups could have “small world” properties (Watts, Strogatz, 1998), 
which are consistent with the previous observation of a majority of linkages having 
national and continental scopes. Thus, different subsystems organize the worldwide 
network of multinational firms among cities. The question is now how to identify these 
sub-groups. 
 
3. Communities of cities forming the multipolar integration in globalization 
 
To identify the subsystems, we developed a clustering approach that detects communities 
or clusters as groups of cities densely connected to one another and sparsely connected to 
other clusters (Rozenblat et al., 2017). The Spin Glass clustering method (Reichardt & 
Bornholdt, 2006) was applied on the 501 top cities (based on their number of non-oriented 
ownership linkages (Hi+Sj)) in 2010 and 2013 (Fig.3). 
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Figure 3: Clustering of cities’ networks according to multinational firms’ ownership linkages 
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This process results in two partitions that are similar at 75%6 (i.e., 75% of the cities remain 
grouped in the same communities at both dates) (Fig.3). The overall pattern of these 
partitions exhibits 11 clusters encompassing 76% of the total linkages in 2010 and 10 
clusters encompassing 71% of the total linkages in 2013.  
 
In both cases, three classes constitute the core of the worldwide network: North American, 
UK and Commonwealth, and Northern Western Europe and African city clusters. They 
remain quite stable despite slight changes between 2010 and 2013.  
 
Most of the “satellites” connected to this central structure remained the same between 2010 
and 2013: The Iberian and South American group of cities remained dominated by Madrid, 
with 35% of the internal links, and Barcelona, followed by Bilbao, Lisbon, Sao Paulo, 
Seville, Valencia, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires. 
 
The Japanese cluster encompasses nearly 30 cities at both dates, including all Japanese 
cities plus Bangkok, Jakarta and Maastricht. The class is dominated by Tokyo, which 
claims 45% of the total internal linkages, and by Osaka (25%). 
 
South Korea includes all six main South Korean cities. Similar to Tokyo, Seoul 
concentrates more than 40% of the internal links at the two dates, and Pusan concentrates 
20%. 
 
The Indian community of 10 cities highlights the network cohesion of this sub-continental 
country and includes Mauritius and Colombo (Sri Lanka). Mumbai dominates this class, 
with 36% of the internal links, followed by Delhi with 23% and Chennai with 8%. 
 
The Asia-Pacific region is dominated by Chinese cities (Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai), 
and regroups the main Southeast Asian cities (Singapore, Kuala Lumpur). This class also 
includes tax havens, such as the Grand Cayman (8%), Bermuda Kindley (10%) and Tortola 
(Virgin Islands). Australian cities, which were closer to the UK and Commonwealth in 
2010, joined this class in 2013 (Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Brisbane). 
 
Europe is the group that has the most slight changes, mostly by ungrouping or grouping by 
entire national urban systems: German, Eastern European, Russian and Ukrainian cities 
joined the main European cluster between 2010 and 2013. At the opposite end, French 
cities were isolated, led by Paris (39% of the total internal links). This group includes the 
former French colonial cities in Africa (Tunis, Algiers, Douala, and Dakar) and French-
speaking capitals (Accra), all of which were already in the European cluster in 2010. The 
35 Italian cities left the European group, including Lugano (an Italian-speaking city in 
Switzerland). 
 
Therefore, a first major outcome of this clustering approach is the strong cohesion for most 
of the national urban systems in the world. Cities that belong to the same country, 
regardless of whether they are included in a wider continental community, remain mostly 
highly connected in the same clusters. Only in some rare cases such as Switzerland are the 
national cities divided between several groups: Zürich and Bern were encompassed in the 
                                               
6 To compare cluster partitioning, we used the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) method, as proposed by Danon et 
al. (2005). Given two partitional structures of a network, the NMI calculates the proportion of couples remaining in the 
same groups and thus returns a value in a range between 100% (perfect similarity) and 0% (complete dissimilarity). 
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group of American cities in 2010 or in the UK Commonwealth in 2013, whereas Geneva 
and Basel remain closer to Western European cities.  
 
A second important outcome is the persistence of spatial proximity as a determinant factor 
in the constitution of these clusters. They often correspond to a long history of 
geographical relationships, during which the moves and communications were much more 
restrained by the physical distance. The role of physical distances survives today within the 
free trade zones that have been developed regionally throughout the world since the 2nd 
World War and especially since the 1990s. In addition to the physical proximity, other 
historical factors such as the proximity induced by colonialism or common language 
persist through economic preferential linkages that may be reinforced by political and 
defense agreements. This explains the strong integration of United Kingdom cities with 
cities of the Commonwealth countries, cities of Spain and Portugal with South American 
cities, and French cities with those of France’s former African colonies.  
 
National cohesion and physical or cultural/historical distance remain the key components 
for understanding the multi-polar global economic integration in 2010 and 2013. The slight 
shifts between the dates are mostly due to the changes in enterprise network structures 
facing both long- and short-term global transformations. In that respect, one can easily 
assume that companies have different issues and strategies according to their activity 
sector. 
 
4. Multipolar integration of cities by activity sectors 
 
According to the literature underlying the specific role of advanced services in structuring 
the global urban system (Sassen, 1991) and the “multiple globalization” that varies 
according to the skill levels of industry or of services (Krätke, 2014), we computed the 
clustering again on partial networks defined for each large activity sector using the OECD 
(2009) nomenclature. Four large sectors are distinguished based on the nature of the 
activity and skill levels (Fig.4): 
- High-technology manufacturing (HIGH-TECH) includes chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry and the computer, machinery, and motor industry. 
- Low-technology manufacturing (LOW-TECH) encompasses food and beverages, 
textile, paper, coke and petrol, plastic, metal, and printing. 
- Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) are composed by finance and insurance along 
with art, scientific activities, information and communication, transportation, health 
and social services. 
- Less knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) include trade, real estate, administration, 
accommodations and food, and household services.  
 
4.1 Clustering cities by activity sectors 
 
The resulting clusters underline very similar grouping of cities: regardless of the activity 
sector, the same global networking pattern can be identified, including a core formed 
around the three central poles: North America, Europe and UK & Commonwealth. The 
slight differences that appear reflect both the specific sectorial organization of firms and 
the specialization of cities or urban systems in some of these activities. 
 
There are fewer classes for the two manufacturing sectors than there are for the two service 
sectors (8 and 7 for High-technology manufacturing in 2010 and 2013 and 10 and 9 for 
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Low-technology manufacturing; 11 and 10 for Knowledge-intensive Services and 12 and 
11 for Less Knowledge-intensive Services). This difference in the grouping level means 
that more globalization has been achieved in manufacturing than in services. 
 
- For High-technology manufacturing, Japanese cities are very well positioned in 
globalization, thanks to their powerful and numerous keiretsu in the electronic and 
motor industry. After being close to North American cities in 2010, they reoriented 
their dominant connections toward Europe and the UK and Commonwealth due to 
a rise of investments in the more recent period. Investments also increased in this 
sector between Europe and South Korea, which became closer in 2013, and 
between the UK and India.  
- For Low-technology manufacturing, a Middle Eastern community of cities formed 
by Beirut, Riyadh and Kuwait in 2010 rejoined North America in 2013. Bahrain, 
Dubai and Haman are encompassed in the UK & Commonwealth community. This 
community also includes China and Australia in 2010, leaving the group in 2013. 
Europe is in both High-technology and Low-technology manufacturing, which was 
more unified in 2013 than it was in 2010, revealing the growth of continental 
linkages compared to national ones. 
- For services (Fig.4, continuing), Europe is divided into more numerous groups: In 
the Knowledge-intensive services clustering, Scandinavian cities are isolated at 
both dates, whereas French and Italian ones separate in 2013. This European 
segmentation has a stronger emphasis for Less knowledge-intensive services. 
Europe was divided into 6 groups in 2010 and 7 groups in 2013. In addition, the 
community of UK and Commonwealth is more powerful for services than for 
manufacturing. It includes in 2010 most Eastern Asian and Pacific cities (excepted 
Japanese and Korean cities) and Tax Haven cities. For Knowledge-intensive 
services, the UK and Commonwealth community polarized much more than did the 
other groups in 2013. Therefore, the repositioning of London with fewer national 
linkages and more worldwide ones, as noted in the section 2.3 of this chapter, is 
specified here by the restructuring of the Knowledge-intensive services around the 
UK and Commonwealth cities’ community. 
 
Thus, when comparing manufacturing and service cities’ clusters, the outcome is more 
global (and less numerous) clusters for industrial activities than for services, with the latter 
remaining more developed inside national boundaries. This difference emphasizes that the 
globalization of services, despite the high integration of the core cities such as London, 
New York and Tokyo (Sassen, 1991) by the international network of stock exchange, 
remains much less internationalized and more embedded in the national economies 
compared to the globalization of manufacturing. In fact, advanced service providers such 
as advisors and lawyers must be aware of national rules and laws in close connection with 
national institutions that continue to develop their own systems and require specific 
expertise. In contrast, industrial globalization has, for a long time (almost one century), 
developed an international division of labor, which has created a more globalized and more 
complex and dense international city system.   
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Figure 4: Clustering of cities’ networks by activity skill level 
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Figure 4 (continuing): Clustering of cities’ networks by activity skill level 
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4.2 Evolution of cities’ networks by activity sectors 
 
To understand the general feature each category of activities creates in the Cities’ system 
as a whole, we compare the rank-size hierarchy of cities for each category in 2010 and 
2013 (Fig.5).  
Figure 5: Hierarchies of cities according to their networks by activity skill level 
 
 
In general, industrial networks hierarchize more cities than do service networks. This delay 
comes from the advanced stage of industry in the globalization process, which creates an 
urban system that is closer to a unique hierarchy of cities (despite a remaining dominant 
multi-polar shape). However, this delay tends to diminish between 2010 and 2013 because 
of the faster hierarchization of cities by services induced by their globalization integration 
(which is also visible in the decreasing number of clusters).  
 
For High-technology manufacturing and Knowledge-intensive services, the 2013 curves 
are very similar to the 2010 ones, and the changes are perceptible only in the top of the 
hierarchy for High-technology manufacturing: New York and London, which remained the 
two first cities, lost 20% of their linkages, whereas Tokyo surpassed Paris for third place. 
For Knowledge-intensive services, London maintained its first rank, keeping the same 
number of linkages (that redeployed more in long-distance scopes), whereas New York 
and Paris remained second and third, with a 10% decrease in the number of linkages. In 
both cases, the following cities did not take advantage of these top re-compositions. In 
contrast, after the three top ranks, the 2013 curve is below the 2010 one. 
 
For Low-technology manufacturing and Less knowledge-intensive services, the top cities’ 
hierarchy did not change significantly. However, the cities shifted slightly from the 4th to 
the 30th rank for Low-technology manufacturing and from the 30th to the 200th rank for 
LKIS. For Low-technology manufacturing, this shift reveals the affirmation in the 
command functions of large metropolises either in developed countries, such as Boston, 
Chicago, San Francisco, Osaka, Zürich, Toronto, Vancouver, Amsterdam, Milano, and 
Frankfurt, or in emerging countries, such as Mumbai, Singapore and Beijing. For Less 
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knowledge-intensive services there is a general growth of all national capitals and second-
tier cities in the largest urban systems, thus benefiting a slow diffusion of the globalization 
of their services.  
 
The evolutions of the cities’ communities for the four categories of activities can also be 
evaluated using the NMI index, which measures the similarity between the communities 
obtained in 2010 and in 2013 (see note 6). The comparison is summarized in table 2: 
Table 2: Evolution of clustering of cities’ networks by activity skill level 
 NMI 2010-2013 
HIGH TECH 0.78 
LOW TECH 0.61 
KIS 0.80 
LKIS 0.73 
TOTAL NETWORK 0.75 
 ©Rozenblat, 2016 
 Source: BvD 2010,2013; UNIL-IGD GeodiverCity, 2015 
The NMI indexes evaluate for each clustering its level of change. A high similarity reveals 
very slow evolution, whereas a lower similarity underlines more transformations. 
According to these differences, the manufacturing networks were more modified than the 
service networks, and in both categories, the spatial organization of lower skill activities 
was more transformed than those of higher skills. We can interpret this result from the 
perspective of the evolutionary theory of urban systems: lower-skill activities belong to a 
more mature economic cycle and are diffused in a larger number of cities than are higher-
skill activities. 
 
One can wonder if the evolution of the four clustering led them to converge or, contrarily, 
to diverge. The answer to this question can be addressed again by the NMI indexes, put in 
matrices, which compare for each date the cities’ clusters according to the four activities 
(Tab. 3): 
 
Table 3: Similarity between clustering of cities’ networks by activity skill level 
NMI-2010 HIGH TECH LOW TECH KIS LKIS  NMI-2013 HIGH TECH LOW TECH KIS LKIS 
HIGH TECH 1     HIGH TECH 1    
LOW TECH 0.75 1    LOW TECH 0.72 1   
KIS 0.72 0.76 1   KIS 0.65 0.67 1  
LKIS 0.68 0.74 0.80 1  LKIS 0.56 0.65 0.78 1 
 ©Rozenblat, 2016 
 Source: BvD 2010,2013; UNIL-IGD GeodiverCity, 2015 
 
The NMI similarity measures show that the city clusters in 2013 are less similar than those 
obtained in 2010. Despite the general similarity between the specific activity clustering 
results that we noted in 4.1, there was a slight divergence of the cities’ network shapes 
between the dates. Whereas the most central cities (London, New York, Paris, Tokyo) 
were diversified, continuing to dominate all four networks, each city and sub-urban system 
tended to develop toward a specific domain, making the whole urban network more 
complex (observed by the regular decrease of the number of clusters between 2010 and 
2013).  
 
This trend of specialization and growth of complexity would certainly be a part of the 
long-term process of activity cycles, in which mature activities diffuse hierarchically 
through urban systems (see Chapter 1 in this volume). In the meantime, the shifts between 
London, New York, Paris and Tokyo can be seen as a result of the recent crisis that could 
constitute bifurcations that can transform the whole global urban system from a long-term 
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perspective. 
 
 
5. Discussion of the factors influencing cities’ global multipolar integrations 
 
The previous empirical study permitted us to evaluate cities’ integration in globalization 
within the processes that act at the global level of the whole urban system. To understand 
such positions, we often need to mobilize the local, national or continental history and path 
dependence. Putting into perspective the previous results leads to a wider discussion of the 
main local and national specific factors that unevenly influence cities’ global integration. 
 
5.1 Clusters’ internal hierarchies and hubs 
 
Most of the dominant cities of the central clusters correspond to cities that are classically 
mentioned as “world cities”: London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, and Amsterdam. The 
regularity of these cities’ centrality in the service and industrial sectors confirms the 
correlation highlighted by Wall & Van der Knaap (2011). Moreover, the results 
demonstrate that the capital cities of peripheral regions constitute intermediary for cities of 
their subsystems reminding the “pivotal intermediary” property that Meyer (1986) defined 
for Mexico City. The level of their cluster domination and their clusters’ hierarchical 
characteristics underline the complexity of the global urban system, better than the 
core/hinterland results of the previous studies on the regionalization of the world city 
networks (Taylor et al., 2002, 2013; Derudder et al., 2003; Alderson & Beckfield, 2004).  
 
Adopting the multi-polar perspective, we managed to evaluate the extent to which the 
“classical world cities” do not have the same levels of dominance (polarization) in their 
own clusters, which reveals different forms of globalization: 
- On the one hand, the cities that dominate their clusters compose more than half of the 
total out-linkages of their respective clusters. These dominant cities are London, Tokyo, 
Paris, Milan and Seoul. They concentrate a high intermediary capacity for decisions, 
playing a central role in the globalization of other cities in their own sub-systems. The 
best example of this type of worldwide role is London, encompassing global control of 
numerous cities around the world. Other cities, such as Tokyo, Paris, Milan and Seoul, 
primarily control their national urban systems.  
- On the other hand, New York for North American cities, Amsterdam for Northern and 
Eastern European cities, and Beijing for Asian-Pacific cities belong to more distributed 
systems, in which many cities exchange firms’ linkages all together and directly with 
cities from other clusters.  
 
5.2 Cities’ clusters at the regional and national scales 
 
In addition, the multipolar system of cities does not function on the same scale around the 
world. The fact that some continental, inter-continental or national scales appear at the 
same scale of cluster cohesion expresses a wide range of levels of global 
openness/cohesion of cities by countries and continents. For Less Knowledge-intensive 
services, Japanese, Korean, Indian, Chinese, French, Italian and even Swiss cities 
constitute single groups that are characterized by a high cohesion level of their national 
cities’ networks. These national networks produce the same level of interdependencies that 
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exist in much wider regional or global communities, such as North America, the UK and 
Commonwealth or Iberia and South America.  
 
The boundaries of the clusters of cities’ networks do not always strictly correspond to 
national borders. For example, the Japanese cluster also includes South Eastern Asian 
cities such as Bangkok, Manila or Jakarta, especially for High-technology activities 
(Fig.6). 
Figure 6: Japanese cluster of cities for HIGH TECH networks 
Here, Tokyo and Osaka develop their influence beyond Japanese boundaries. South Korea 
and Australia, which are economically close to Japan (for both, Japan is the second largest 
export country after China [UNCTAD, 2014]), remain a distinct sub-system in the case of 
South Korea, whereas Australian cities belong to UK and Commonwealth or Asian cities 
communities.  
 
5.3 Cities with a long-range integration: Economic specialization and specific factors 
 
Cities that belong to different clusters according to their activities have a particular 
position in the globalization process. They constitute specialized or regional pivots in the 
expansion of multinational firms’ strategies, hosting regional or specialized centers of 
industry or services. These cities are principally located in Asia, Australia and South 
America, plus Zurich and Tel Aviv. Most of them move between UK & Commonwealth, 
North American or European clusters.  
 
The representation of the UK & Commonwealth KIS cluster (Fig.7) offers a partial view of 
these cities, which are in different clusters, depending on the activity and the period of 
time. In that particular case, London’s influence, beyond other UK cities, exists in 2010 
Tax Haven places (Grand Cayman, Bermuda Kindley, Barbados), Asian major 
metropolises (Hong-Kong, Singapore, Taipei, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Karachi, Beijing, 
Shanghai), Middle Eastern cities (Riyadh, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Cairo, Algiers), and 
African cities (Nairobi, Accra and South African cities). As of 2013, Tax Haven places and 
Australian cities remain in this UK & Commonwealth KIS cluster, but Chinese cities 
(except Hong-Kong) have left, forming a new cluster with South Korean cities. Middle 
Eastern cities mostly joined Indian cities by 2013. In contrast, the UK & Commonwealth 
cluster has expanded in Africa to Lagos, Kampala, Gaborone, Blantyre and Dar Es Salaam.   
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Figure 7: UK & Commonwealth cluster of cities for KIS networks (2010-2013) 
 
 
Thus, the influence of Knowledge-intensive services of the UK was quite transformed in 
only a few years, mostly because of the expansion of London long-range linkages on the 
one hand and the bottom-up development of Asian cities on the other hand. 
 
5.4 The special case of City-states 
 
The bottom-up emergence of cities in these global processes impacts entire urban systems 
but also single cities. Some of these cities, which seem to no longer be embedded in 
national urban systems, deserve special attention. These forms of what is occasionally 
called “city-states”, emerge owing to the transnational trade, migration or capital, operated 
by people, firms or institutions that transgress national boundaries and organize their 
activities or trajectories beyond frontiers, and one can observe them in the multinational 
firms’ networks.  
 
City-states have very different histories, but they often (but not always) share a common 
role as a transportation hub. In the Asian area, Hong Kong and Singapore had important 
roles as maritime and air hubs during the second half of the 20th century (Murayama, 
2000). In the 2000s, Luxemburg also became the first European hub for air-freight 
(supported by the Luxemburgish plant of the main European center of Amazon). From this 
perspective, Abu Dhabi, Dubai or Doha benefited from the petro-dollars investments in 
new air companies (Emirates and Qatar Airways), which made them major hubs between 
Europe, Africa and Asia. Accessibility is a sine qua non condition of being integrated in 
globalization, but it is not sufficient. National policies leveraged their role also by 
branding, with famous architectural, artistic, political or sporting events aimed at appearing 
as a world flagship.  
 
Last but not least is the tax haven characteristic. Thanks to their tax advantages, some city-
states are particularly active in linking groups of cities for highly skilled activities. Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Luxemburg play a large role in the global 
organization of advance business services in complementary world cities (Wojcik, 2013). 
In the clustering approach that we developed on multinational firm networks, most of these 
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Tax Haven cities appear in the Knowledge-intensive service cluster of the UK & 
Commonwealth, participating in the higher business game of the world. However, not all 
of the Tax Haven places benefit from real power and diversified urban development, as is 
observed in the “dubaization” phenomena. This “dubaization” concept describes the 
locally initiated development aiming to leverage a new world financial center and 
transforming the oil economy into a “local post-oil company” (Elsheshtawy, 2010). 
Bermuda Kindley and the Grand Cayman and Virgin Islands, despite their confirmed role 
in the global finance, cannot be considered as metropolises, but are rather characterized as 
offshore places depending on London and other global cities (Wojcik, 2013).  
 
Although some of these cities have been concentrated for 25 years, with specific efforts to 
satisfy the necessary conditions for strong global integration into the “global metropolitan 
culture” that is characterized by a similar urban environment and way of life (Harvey, 
2012; Rossi, 2017), one can wonder if they are so different from other cities that are more 
embedded in their national urban systems. 
 
First, many cities that are qualified as city-states, actually belong to national urban systems 
that are stronger than one usually assumes (Tab.4). Only three cities have the status of a 
state: Singapore, Hong Kong, and Macau (the last two ones are not real states but are 
territories with specific status). In addition, very few cities concentrate more than half of 
the population of their states and are neither major tax haven nor metropolises that count in 
global flows. The only most-populated city that appears both in this primacy table and in 
the tax haven lists is Panama City (Wojcik, 2012). Panama City enjoys all of the 
previously mentioned factors, such as accessibility (the obliged corridor between Atlantic 
and Pacific) and tax advantages. In global clustering, it occasionally belongs to North 
America (for Knowledge-intensive services and High-technology manufacturing), Iberia 
and South America (for Less Knowledge-intensive services) and London and the 
Commonwealth cluster (for Low-technology manufacturing). In this way, it is similar to 
Tel Aviv and Zürich, which belong to different clusters depending to the activity 
considered. These cities can be qualified as very global in this way.  
 
Second, the other cities that have a high value in Table 4 are primary cities in their urban 
system serving as a gatekeeper pole of integration in globalization. They concentrate most 
of the population, economy and institutions of their country, and they drive their national 
urban system in their cluster. The development of their national urban system depends 
widely on the type of governance decentralization.  
 
For example, in Japan, urban development has been planned since the 1960s at the regional 
and prefectural levels to regulate the territorial equilibrium, avoiding a rise of the hyper-
concentration in Tokyo that was already very high (see Abe et al., Chapter 7 in this 
volume). Tokyo still polarizes most of the economic networks, as confirmed by the 
permanent high cohesion of the Japanese cluster of cities. For Argentina, the primacy of 
Buenos Aires remains very high, despite some policies attempting to strengthen the 
secondary poles and the colonization of rural settlements (Cuervo Gonzalez & Moura, 
Chapter 8 in this volume). Buenos Aires also plays the dramatic role of a gateway for the 
global linkages of all national cities. In these two examples, as observed in many countries, 
primacy cities are the key factor of the national cohesion that is observed throughout the 
clustering study.  
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Table 4: Similarity between clustering of cities’ networks by activity skill level (2010-2013) 
RA
NK
 
COUNTRY CITY City 
population 
1950 
(in ,000) 
City 
population 
2015 
(in ,000) 
Percentage 
of the city's 
population 
in its own 
country in 
1950  
Percentage 
of the city's 
population 
in its own 
country in 
2015  
RA
NK
 
COUNTRY CITY City 
population 
1950 
(in ,000) 
City 
population 
2015 
(in ,000) 
Percentage 
of the city's 
population 
in its own 
country in 
1950  
Percentage 
of the city's 
population 
in its own 
country in 
2015  
1 
China. Hong 
Kong SAR Hong Kong 1 682 7 314 85 100 22 Japan Tokyo 11 275 38 001 14 30 
2 Singapore Singapore 1 016 5 619 99 100 23 Bahrain Manama 40 411 34 30 
3 
China. Macao 
SAR Macao 190 584 99 100 24 Estonia Tallinn 223 391 20 30 
4 Kuwait Kuwait City 63 2 779 41 71 25 New Zealand Auckland 319 1 344 17 30 
5 Puerto Rico San Juan 451 2 463 20 67 26 Georgia Tbilisi 612 1 147 17 29 
6 Djibouti Djibouti 20 529 32 60 27 Liberia Monrovia 35 1 264 4 28 
7 Uruguay Montevideo 1 212 1 707 54 50 28 
Dominican 
Republic 
Santo 
Domingo 180 2 945 8 28 
8 Mongolia Ulaanbaatar 70 1 377 9 47 29 Portugal Lisbon 1 304 2 884 15 28 
9 Israel Tel Aviv-Jaffa 418 3 608 33 45 30 Greece Athens 1 347 3 052 18 28 
10 Panama Panama City 171 1 673 20 43 31 Guinea-Bissau Bissau 18 492 3 27 
11 Gabon Libreville 15 707 3 41 32 
United Arab 
Emirates Dubai 20 2 415 29 26 
12 Congo Brazzaville 83 1 888 10 41 33 Gambia Banjul 26 504 10 25 
13 Lebanon Beirut 322 2 226 24 38 34 Ireland Dublin 626 1 169 21 25 
14 Chile Santiago 1 322 6 507 22 36 35 Azerbaijan Baku 897 2 374 31 24 
15 Paraguay Asuncion 258 2 356 18 35 36 Costa Rica San Jose 148 1 170 15 24 
16 Argentina Buenos Aires 5 098 15 180 30 35 37 
TFYR 
Macedonia Skopje 120 503 10 24 
17 Armenia Yerevan 341 1 044 25 35 38 Mauritania Nouakchott 3 968 0 24 
18 Qatar Doha 18 718 72 32 39 Senegal Dakar 214 3 520 9 23 
19 Peru Lima 1 066 9 897 14 32 40 Haiti Port-au-Prince 133 2 440 4 23 
20 Latvia Riga 490 621 25 32 41 Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 262 6 837 4 23 
21 Qatar Ar-Rayyan 2 677 8 30 42 Denmark Copenhagen 1 216 1 268 28 22 
©Rozenblat, 2016, Source: UN, World urban prospect, 2014; UN Demographic statistics, 2016 
 
Third, complementarily to national policies of decentralization that have been developed in 
many countries for five decades, the independence of cities regarding their national 
governments has meant a general movement observed in cities of the world since the 
1990s. This trend developed first in large city-regions with different temporal stages and 
consequences because of uneven contexts that nevertheless had a common cause: “The rise 
of entrepreneurial city induced by economic globalization and the retreat of national 
government in policy making, has been accompanied by cities’ efforts to “delink” or 
decouple themselves from their respective national economies” (Short & Kim, 1999, 
p.128). Lever (1997), focusing on European cities, observed that a very small number a 
cities were able to break out from their national general conditions, identifying Barcelona, 
Frankfurt, or Milan as delinking their national economies, with their rates exceeding 
national performance or through specialization in specific sectors. In fact, very few cities 
in the world have managed to realize this decoupling: their national urban system remains 
a high determinant for cities’ integration in globalization. Both primary cities and cities’ 
common membership to countries, their institutions, their economic and social system and 
their culture maintain strong mutual inter-dependencies between cities within national 
systems. 
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6. Conclusion: Partitioning cities of the world according to multipolar urban 
networks 
 
This chapter aimed to identify the sub-systems of cities that form the whole pattern of 
cities’ integration at the global scale. Indeed, the assumption was confirmed that the most 
intensively interconnected cities form sub-systems that compose the global network, which 
is not structured around a single center but rather appears as a multi-polar world 
(Rozenblat et al., 2017). Identifying these sub-systems enables us to understand the 
common trajectories and contrasted evolution of cities since the middle of the 20th century, 
which will be detailed in the next regional/national chapters. In analyzing the globalization 
process through a urban system perspective, we can determine the extent to which some 
national inherited structures remain relevant to understanding urban dynamics and the 
extent to which new geographical levels have appeared between the local and the global.  
 
Although the integration of urban systems inside multinational firm ownership networks 
represents only a part of the globalization process in one of its financial aspects, it reveals 
the pervasive role of national cohesion between cities and the emergence of new 
continental or regional solidarities as well as historical footprints of ancient empires that 
remain alive today 
 
The multi-polar vision of world cities that we developed corresponds to a wider change in 
the comprehension of the feedback processes maintaining or transforming cities’ insertion 
in globalization. The classical core/peripheral system is replaced by a two-level system that 
considers the cores and peripheries both between and within clusters. Free trade zones and 
continental proximities are important in this stepwise process, participating in the feedback 
maintenance and reinforcement of the global strength of the central cities of some of the 
clusters.  
Overall, we demonstrated in this chapter that national urban systems remain very cohesive, 
because cities of the same country exchange more together than with other foreign cities. 
This confirms the relevance of the concept well illustrated in the scholars on urban systems 
for over 30 years in the IGU urban commission and coined in the context of globalization 
under the expression of the “nested city” by Hill and Fujita (2003). In addition, cultural 
distance and economic specialization play a secondary role that is not as strong as national 
cohesion. This is demonstrated, for example, by the isolation of the Chinese urban system 
from London’s advance business services influence (in KIS) during the period 2010-2013, 
thanks to the rapid development of China’s own multinational firms of advanced services 
preferentially expanding their networks within the national territory. 
The 2010-2013 evolution shows only very few transformations of the whole multi-polar 
global system. Thus, despite the complexity of today’s delineation of urban systems, the 
results produced here by using the city network approach offer relevant partitioning that 
can partly orient the way in which we organize this book. Of course, it represents only part 
of the story of the development of urban systems; in complement, we must account for 
their demographic dynamics while highlighting other aspects of their systemic trajectories. 
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